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Portfolio Theory, Capital Markets, and the Marginal
Effect of Federal Margin Regulations
JOSEPH V. RIZZI*
The margin prohibitions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934'
severely restrict the availability of credit for the purchase of securi-
ties. Pursuant to section 7 of the Act,2 the Board of Governors of the
* Vice-President, T.B.R. Enterprises, Inc. B.S., De Paul University, 1971; M.B.A., Univer-
sity of Chicago, 1973; J.D., Notre Dame University Law School, 1976. Law Clerk to United
States Senior District Judge Julius J. Hoffman, 1976-77.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77kk (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Margin Requirements.
(a) For the purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchase or
carrying of securities, the Federal Reserve Board [Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System] shall, . . . from time to time thereafter, prescribe rules and
regulations with respect to the amount of credit that may be initially extended and
subsequently maintained on any security (other than an exempted security). For
the initial extension of credit, such rules and regulations shall be based upon the
following standard: An amount not greater than whichever is the higher of-
(1) 55 per centum of the current market price of the security, or
(2) 100 per centum of the lowest market price of the security during the preced-
ing thirty-six calendar months, but not more than 75 per centum of the current
market price.
Such rules and regulations may make appropriate provision with respect to the
carrying of undermargined accounts for limited periods and under specified condi-
tions; the withdrawal of funds or securities; the substitution or additional purchases
of securities; the transfer of accounts from one lender to another; special or different
margin requirements for delayed deliveries, short sales, arbitrage transactions, and
securities to which paragrpah (2) of this subsection does not apply; the bases and
the methods to be used in calculating loans, and margins and market prices; and
similar administrative adjustments and details. ...
(b) Notwithstanding the provisons of subsection (a) of this section, the Federal
Reserve Board [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System], may, from
time to time with respect to all or specified securities or transactions, or classes of
securities, or classes of transactions, by such rules and regulations (1) prescribe
such lower margin requirements for the initial extension or maintenance of credit
as it deems necessary or appropriate for the, accommodation of commerce and
industry, having due regard to the general credit situation of the country, and
(2) prescribe such higher margin requirements for the initial extension or mainte-
nance of credit as it may deem necessary or appropriate to prevent the excessive
use of credit to finance transactions in securities.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any member of a national securities exchange or any
broker or dealer, directly or indirectly, to extend or maintain credit or arrange for
the extension or maintenance of credit to or for any customer-
(1) on any security (other than an exempted security), in contravention of
the rules and regulations which the Board of Governors of the Fedeal Reserve
System shall prescribe under subsections (a) and (b) of this section;
(2) without collateral or on any collateral other than securities, except in
accordance with such rules and regulations as the Board of Governors of the
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Federal Reserve System can limit the credit extended on security
purchases by broker dealers,3 banks,4 and other persons.' Also, bor-
rowerse are subject to margin restrictions. The desirability of these
complex restrictions placed on margin trading is, however, question-
able.
This article analyzes the desirability of margin prohibitions in
light of modern capital market theory. First, the reasoning behind
margin provisions generally, and the transactions subject to regula-
tion will be analyzed. Second, utilizing modern capital market
theory, it will be shown that the margin limitations are worse than
ineffectual. Presently, margin restrictions actually contribute to
stock market instability. Finally, an approach will be proposed to
remedy the gap between the present scope of margin prohibitions
and investor requirements under existing economic conditions.
Federal Reserve System may prescribe (A) to permit under specified condi-
tions and for a limited period any such member, broker, or dealer to main-
tain a credit initially extended in conformity with the rules and regulations
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and (B) to permit
the extension or maintenance of credit in cases where the extension or main-
tenance of credit is not for the purpose of purchasing or carrying securities
or of evading or circumventing the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsec-
tion.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person not subject to subsection (C) to extend or
maintain credit or to arrange for the extension or maintenance of credit for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying any security, in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Federal Reserve Board [Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System] shall prescribe to prevent the excessive use of credit for the purchas-
ing or carrying of or trading in securities in circumvention of the other provisions
of this section. Such rules and regulations may impose upon all loans made for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying securities limitations similar to those imposed
upon members, brokers, or dealers by subsection (c) of this section and the rules
and regulations thereunder. This subsection and the rules and regulations thereun-
der shall not apply (A) to a loan made by a person not in the ordinary course of his
business, (B) to a loan on an exempted security, (C) to a loan to a dealer to aid in
the financing of the distribution of securities to customers not through the medium
of a national securities exchange, (D) to a loan by a bank on a security other than
an equity security, or (E) to such other loans as the Federal Reserve Board [Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System] shall, by such rules and regulations
as it may deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors, exempt, either unconditionally or upon specified terms and conditions
or for stated periods, from the operation of this subsection and the rules and regula-
tions thereunder.
3. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1976).
4. Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1976). See also Note, Federal Margin Regulations as a
Basis For Civil Liability, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1462 (1966).
5. Regulation G, 12 C.F.R. § 207 (1976).
6. Regulation X, 12 C.F.R. § 224 (1976); see Note, Civil Liability for Margin Viola-
tions-The Effect of § 7(f) and Regulation X, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 93 (1974).
Federal Margin Regulations.
MARGIN CONTROLS: LEGAL PARAMETERS
The Objectives of Margin Regulation
Section 7(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 empowers the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to "prescribe
rules and regulations with respect to the amount of credit that may
be initially extended and subsequently maintained on any secu-
rity. . .. "I Pursuant to this authority, the Federal Reserve Board
has promulgated several rules regulating the use of credit in securi-
ties transactions by establishing the maximum loan value for a
securities purchase.' Regulation T9 determines the initial margin
requirements that broker-dealers'O may extend to their customers.
In substance, Regulation T requires a broker-dealer to obtain the
required margin from a customer in general account transactions"
as promptly as possible, but in no event later than five business days
after the date of the transaction." If the creditor fails to receive
deposits sufficient to satisfy this requirement within the specified
maximum period, he must "promptly cancel or otherwise liquidate
the transaction or the unsettled portion thereof."' 3
Regulation U' applies to all banks. It provides: "No bank shall
make any loan secured directly or indirectly by any stock for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying any margin stock in an amount
exceeding the maximum loan value of the collateral."' s Thus, banks
are subject to regulations similar to those of broker-dealers under
Regulation T.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1970); see note 2 supra.
8. The margin represents the capital which must be furnished by the investor in a pur-
chase or short sale. The margin currently required is 50%. 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(a) (1976).
9. Id. § 220.
10. Regulation T applies to all brokers and dealers as defined in sections 3(a)(4) and
3(a)(5) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), (5) (1970).
11. Credit purchases are made on general or margin accounts. The customer pays only a
portion of the purchase price in cash and receives credit for an indefinite period from the
broker-dealer for the balance. The regulation also provides for a number of special accounts,
the most significant of which is the special cash account. The special cash account is essen-
tially a delayed payment account whereby the broker-dealer extends credit upon the reliance
that the customer will make full cash payment for securities within a short time. See 2 L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1248-53 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. See also
Judson & Emerson, The Effect on Regulation Ton Cash Transactions in Securities, 44 MICH.
L. REV. 997 (1946); Loss & Vernon, When-Issued Securities Trading in Law and Practice, 54
YALE L.J. 741, 758-60 (1945).
12. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(b) (1976).
13. Id. § 220.4(c)(2). Moreover, pursuant to the preservation of the right of any exchange
to establish margin requirements, the New York Stock Exchange has promulgated its own
initial extension of maintenance margin requirements. New York Stock Exchange Rule 431,
CONSTITUTION AND RULES 1 2431 (1975).
14. 12 C.F.R. § 221 (1976).
15. Id. § 221.1(a).
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Regulation G16 was promulgated in 1969 to cover all other domes-
tic lenders previously unregulated by Regulations T and U. Regu-
lation G requires registration of every person who in the ordinary
course of business during any calendar quarter extends or arranges
for the extension of a total of $50,000 or more in credit, or has
outstanding at any time during the calendar quarter $100,000 or
more, secured directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by collateral
that includes margin securities. 7 These registrants then become
subject to general requirements similar to those provided by Regula-
tion U.
To prevent the frustration of margin regulations by foreign land
immune to domestic margin controls, Regulation X11 was enacted.
Basically, it provides that the borrower is prohibited from borrowing
if the lender is prohibited from lending by Regulations T, U, or G,
or in the case of a foreign lender, if he would have been prohibited
from lending by Regulation G if he had been subject to it.'"
The above margin restrictions have three separate objectives. 0
First, on a macroeconomic level, they seek to limit the amount of
credit directed by speculation into the stock market and out of more
desirable uses of commerce and industry.' Second, the regulations
attempt to protect the borrower by restricting his possible leverage,
thereby making it impossible for him to buy securities on too thin
a margin.2 Finally, the margin controls seek to stabilize stock mar-
ket fluctuations by regulating the supply of investment capital.2 3
Although seemingly dissimilar, the above stated goals share a
common desire to reduce risk and speculation through limits on the
use of leverage. Due to the incomplete nature of the controls, how-
ever, margin regulations are poorly related to the achievement of
satisfactory risk reduction.24 This has lead directly to the current
dissatisfaction with the controls.
16. Id. § 207.
17. Id. § 207.1(a).
18. Id. § 224.
19. Id. § 224.2
20. See 2 Loss, supra note 11, at 1242-43.
21. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934). The statute itself speaks in terms
of "preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of securities." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(a) (1970).
22. S. REP. No. 1445, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934). See, e.g., Landry v. Hemphili, Noyes
& Co., 473 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002, rehearing denied, 415 U.S.
960 (1975).
23. For the view of the Federal Reserve Board, see 1 JOINT COMM. ON THE ECONOMIC
REPORT, MONETARY POLICY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC DEBT, S. Doc. No. 123, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 409-10 (1952). It appears in recent years, at least, that the chief emphasis is
on the stabilization of stock market fluctuations. See 2 Loss, supra note 11, at 1243.
24. See Moore, Stock Market Margin Requirements, 74 J. POL. ECON. 158 (1966). Moore's
[Vol. 8
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Dissatisfaction with the Margin Regulations
There is serious question whether margin controls are effective in
achieving their formal objectives. Conclusive evidence that margin
restrictions have contributed to sounder capital markets is lacking.
On the other hand, preliminary evidence suggests that margin con-
trols have little or no effect on risky or speculative behavior.25 This
is predictable in light of the incomplete nature of the margin con-
trols. Margin restrictions seek to limit speculative fever by restrict-
ing the amount of leverage that may be used to purchase stocks.
Leverage, however, is but one way of increasing the risk of a pur-
chase. An alternative that margin controls fail to reach is to hold
an unleveraged portfolio of high-risk securities.
Like many partial controls, margin controls may be worse than
ineffectual. The margin controls may prohibit an investor from
holding a strongly leveraged portfolio of relatively safe securities,
although his investment may be less risky than an unleveraged
portfolio of risky securities.28 Furthermore, these controls may con-
tribute to instability by creating an artificial demand for the more
volatile stocks listed on stock exchanges, resulting in the bidding up
of the prices of those stocks to the point where their expected return
is below that of less volatile, less risky, stocks,27 thereby distorting
the supply schedules of equity funds and interfering with the ef-
fluent allocation of capital. To evaluate better the effects of margin
restriction on investors and securities markets, it is necessary to
discuss modern capital theory.
ECONOMIC APPROACH TO INVESTMENT CHOICE: THEORY AND
APPLICATION
Modern capital market theory seeks to determine the prices of
securities under conditions of uncertainty in a market which is in
equilibrium.2 1 It is in reality a combination of separate theories
preliminary statistical study concludes that "not one of the arms of the legislation establish-
ing margin requirements has been established." Id.
25. Id. Even if effective, at what cost? See text accompanying notes 51-60 infra.
26. Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HARv. L. REv. 603, 608 (1970); see note
27 infra.
27. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 200 (1973) [hereinafter cited as POSNER];
Black, Jensen & Scholes, The Capital Assets Pricing Model: Some Empirical Tests, in
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF CAPITAL MARKETS 79 (M. Jensen ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Black, Jensen & Scholes]. See generally Bines, Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment
Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 721 (1976); Clark, The
Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976).
28. Equilibrium is a state of rest, i.e., the attainment of a position from which there is
neither incentive nor opportunity to move. The equilibrium price is one from which there is
no tendency to move, so long as the underlying supply and demand conditions do not alter.
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concerning risk, investor reaction to risk, and the efficiency of secur-
ities markets. The following discussion will establish the analytical
underpinnings of modern capital market theory, derive implications
as to investor behavior, and evaluate its application to the margin
regulations.
Modern Capital Market Theory
Inherent in the concept of investor behavior is the element of risk.
Margin regulations are essentially legal standards regulating the
maximum level of acceptable risk appropriate for a given invest-
ment; however, the regulations are based upon an incomplete con-
cept of risk, the risk of capital loss. This concept of risk assumes that
investors are concerned exclusively with capital losses, rather than
with all possible future values of their investments. Consequently,
this approach ignores the probabilities associated with these other
possible values. Economic risk is concerned not only with the risk
of capital loss, but also with all possible future deviations from that
which was expected. This uncertainty measure of risk 9 is in marked
contrast to the legal approach which concentrates exclusively on
capital loss. The narrow legal concept of risk is but a subcategory
of the more general concept of uncertainty risk. Exclusive concen-
tration on capital loss can lead to imprudent investment decisions
since it is possible that one portfolio may exhibit greater economic
risk than another, even though that portfolio has a lower probablity
of capital loss. 0 By not limiting its inquiry to capital loss, the eco-
nomic concept of risk incorporates more available investment infor-
mation and, therefore, provides a more complete measure of risk.
The economic concept of risk is thus a more appropriate index of
risk because it considers every possible future deviation.3'
See R. LEFTWICH, THE PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 358 (1970); G. STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE 93 (3d ed. 1972); Cohen, The Suitability rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE
L.J. 1604 (1971); Kassouf, Towards a Legal Framework for Efficiency and Equity in the
Securities Markets, 25 HASTINGS L.J. (1974); Mundheim, Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers:
The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445.
29. The statistical measure of uncertainty risk, standard deviation, measures the width
of the random variables' probability distribution. For the purpose of simplicity this article
will assume a normal distribution. This assumption does not detract from the analysis which
can be generalized to non-normal symmetric stable distributions. See Fama, Portfolio Analy-
sis in a Stable Paretian Market, 11 MANAGEMENT Sol. 404-19 (1965).
The use of the term risk for the remainder of this article will be restricted to its economic
connotation, unless otherwise specified.
30. Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, supra note 26, at 619; see Note, Economic
Analysis and the Prudent Man Rule Under ERISA: Efficienty versus the Public Interest, 7
Loy. CMI. L.J. 683, 705-13 (1976).
31. Id.
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In addition to being a more appropriate index of risk, the eco-
nomic concept of risk emphasizes the relationship between the risk
of an individual security and the risk of a portfolio.32 This is a
significant contribution since the risk of a portfolio is not the simple
arithmetic mean of the average risk of the individual securities but
rather the covariance 33 among the individual securities within the
portfolio. In fact, with a large, well-diversified portfolio, the effect
of the independent risk of a security upon the portfolio is likely to
be quite small, almost trivial, relative to the effect of the security's
covariance with the portfolio.34 Therefore, it is possible to reduce the
risk of the portfolio as a whole by the addition of a speculative
security .3
Thus, the owner of a diversified portfolio is shielded against fac-
tors operating to depress the securities of a particular firm or market
because such factors usually tend to improve the earnings of some
other firm or market.36 An index of risk which measures a security's
risk without consideration of the effect of that security upon a port-
folio is incomplete and meaningless 37 because the effect of a single
security's independent risk upon a portfolio is de minimis. There-
fore, the true economic measure of a security's risk is its contribu-
tion to portfolio risk.
Modern capital market theory also recognizes that investment
decision-making under uncertainty is two-dimensional. The two rel-
evant dimensions are the expected return and the degree of risk. 8
Every investor faces a trade-off: he will incur greater amounts of risk
only if compensated by increased returns. The investor does not
choose between risk minimization and return maximization, but
32. Id. See Note, Fiduciary Standards and the Prudent Man Rule Under the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 HARV. L. REv. 960 (1975); Note, Prudence in
Trust Investment, 3 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 491 (1975); Note, Trustee Investment Powers: Impru-
dent Application of the Prudent Man Rule, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 519 (1975).
33. Covariance is the degree to which two variables move together. For a more complete
discussion of covariance analysis in portfolio theory and investment management see Bines,
supra note 27, at 741-50.
34. For a demonstration of this fact, see E. FAMA & M. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE
253-55 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FAMA & MILLER].
35. H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENT 112-
15 (1959).
36. POSNER, supra note 27, at 192. Approximately 90% of the independent risk.in a portfo-
lio can be eliminated through diversification by the inclusion of only 10 randomly selected
stocks. Therefore, investors can easily obtain a combination of assets that will approximate
the market. See Evans & Archer, Diversification and the Reduction of Dispersion: An Empiri-
cal Analysis, 23 J. FIN. 761 (1968).
37. See FAMA & MILLER, supra note 34, at 291. See also Peltzman, Capital Investment in
Commercial Banking and Its Relationship to Portfolio Regulation, 78 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1970).
38. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, STOCK MARKET: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (1973)
[hereinafter cited as LORIE & HAMILTON].
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rather seeks the maximization of return for a given degree of risk. 9
In equilibrium, the price of any security will be a function of two
components. 0 The first is a risk-free rate of return.' The second is
a risk premium which compensates the investor for incurring the
risk associated with the return. Investors, of course, are compen-
sated only for a particular kind of risk-market risk.4" Independent
risk43 can be eliminated through diversification." Since investors do
not have to bear independent risk, they are not compensated for it.
Thus, an investor who wishes to increase his expected return must
do so by increasing his exposure to market risk and not to indepen-
dent risk."5
Then, too, capital assets are priced in an efficient market." The
prices of securities in an efficient market fully reflect available in-
formation and adjust quickly and in an unbiased manner to new
information. 7 The implication, here, is not that "every stock is
correctly valued at every moment in time but that the cost of find-
ing out whether or not it is correctly valued will usually exceed the
39. Id. See Friedman & Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risks, 56 J. POL.
EcON. 279 (1948).
40. See Linter, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13 (1965); Linter, Security
Prices, Risk, and Maximal Gains from Diversification, 20 J. FIN. 587 (1965); Sharpe, Capital
Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
For a clarification of the Sharpe-Linter models see Fama, Risk, Return and Equilibrium:
Some Clarifying Comments, 23 J. FIN. 29 (1968).
41. The return on short-term federal government securities is a good example of a security
with a risk from rate of return.
42. Market risk is that portion of a security's risk which is related to the risk of all other
securities in the capital market. See F. Black, Capital Market Theory: An Introduction 4
(Feb. 1972) (University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Wkg. Paper Serv. No. 24B)
[hereinafter cited as Black].
43. Independent risk is the risk that a security will decline in price independently of
whether the market as a whole is rising or falling. See id.; Modigliani & Poque, An Introduc-
tion to Risk & Return, Part I, 30 FIN. ANAL. J. 68, 69-72 (Mar.-Apr. 1974).
44. See LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 204; W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND
CAPITAL MARKETS 77-103 (1970); FAMA & MILLER, supra note 35, at 253-55.
45. This is accomplished through leverage and the use of debt, and not by concentration
in riskier securities. See G. BIGGER, RISK-ADJUSTED PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE: ITS INVESTMENT
IMPLICATIONS 32 (1971); Lorie, Diversification: Old and New, J. PORTFOLIO MANGMT. 25, 27-28
(1975).
46. The term commonly used to describe this situation is that security prices follow a
random walk, i.e., the successive price changes are statistically independent. For the evidence
on this fact, see Fama, The Behavior of Stock Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34 (1965); Granger &
Morgenstern, Spectral Analysis of New York Stock Market Prices, 16 KYKLOS 1-27 (1963);
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 35 J. FIN. 383
(1970).
47. The implication is not that every stock is correctly valued at every moment in time,
but that the cost of finding out whether or not it is correctly valued and the costs of effectuat-
ing the transition will usually exceed the profits to be made from knowing its true value.
See Fama, supra note 46.
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profits to be made from knowing its true value."4 The analysis of
past price changes and public information provides no help in
achieving increased returns in an efficient market. Investors can
increase their expected return only through risk manipulation and
not by attempting to presage general market movements.49
The concepts of modern capital market theory, uncertainty as a
measure of risk, risk-return relations, and the efficiency of capital
markets will now be used to derive a modern standard of investor
behavior. 0
Investor Behavior Under Modern Capital Market Theory
In an efficient market, the expected return on a portfolio will
depend more on the amount of risk incurred than on any secret
knowledge or the special abilities of the portfolio manager., There-
fore, in an efficient market an investor should follow a passive
portfolio strategy.2 The specific requirements of such a strategy are
high diversification, low turnover, risk control, minimization of
management fees, and minimization of taxes.
High diversification is a practical necessity since investors are not
compensated for bearing independent risk and the only manner in
which independent risk can be eliminated is through diversification.
In an efficient market, attempts to anticipate market movements
will be counter-productive since they will generate needless broker-
age expenses and management fees as well as an unstable risk level.
Thus, a passive portfolio strategy will generally eschew such actions.
Finally, the investor with a passive portfolio strategy must also
consider whether any gains or losses should be realized for tax pur-
poses and whether any realized gain can receive capital treatment."
48. POSNER, supra note 27, at 193. See also Blume & Friend, A New Look at the Capital
Asset Pricing Model, 28 J. FIN. 19 (1973).
49. Costs of search and underdiversification entailed by attempts to "beat" the market
will generally exceed the returns of such activity. See Black, Implications of the Random
Walk Hypothesis for Portfolio Analysis, 26 FIN. ANAL. J. 1 (Mar.-Apr. 1970).
50. Recent empirical tests of the simple capital asset pricing model have generally sup-
ported its validity. Bines, supra note 27, at 751-58. Nevertheless, the model has been found
to be somewhat inaccurate. To remedy this problem a more sophisticated two-factor model
has been developed which was found to describe accurately the generation of security re-
turns. See Black, Jensen, & Scholes, supra note 27, at 79. See generally Bines, supra note
27, at 734-50.
51. See R. BREALEY, SECURITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET 211 (1971). See also Am-
bachtsher, Portfolio Theory and the Security Analyst, 28 FIN. ANAL. J. 53 (Nov.-Dec. 1972).
52. A passive portfolio strategy implies that an investor should follow a buy-and-hold
strategy, keeping turnover low, and not act on information on specific stocks. This is in
contrast to an active portfolio strategy in which the investor concentrates his holdings in
stocks he believes will perform well, and exchanges one stock for another whenever he gets
new information. See Black, supra note 42, at 3.
53. See LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 258. A logical consequence is the necessity
19771
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In an efficient market, an investor can increase his expected re-
turn only by increasing his risk exposure.14 This can be accom-
plished in either of two ways. First, the investor could increase the
amount of risk incurred by concentrating on stocks of above average
risk. Since investors are compensated only for market risk and not
for independent risk, 5 this strategy would be imprudent. Such a
strategy would produce an underdiversified portfolio" resulting in
the exposure to uncompensated independent risk. The second
method is to hold a well diversified portfolio and then to use lever-
age to increase the amount of risk. This method results only in the
increase of compensation market risk and avoids incurring uncom-
pensated independent risk. Additionally, the interest on the funds
borrowed to obtain leverage can be offset against the portfolio's
investment income to reduce the taxes the shareholder pays on his
investment return. Thus, based upon financial and tax considera-
tions, leverage is the preferred method of increasing the amount of
risk incurred to obtain higher expected returns. 57
Modern capital market theory gives content to the legal parame-
ters constraining investor behavior. Emphasis upon uncertainty as
a measure of risk, risk-return relationships, and the efficiency of
capital markets focuses attention on both the purpose and the rea-
soning behind every investment decision. This permits the law to
be more precise 8 in determining whether the purpose motivating an
investment is acceptable and provides a standard against which the
effectiveness of margin restrictions can be measured.
for utilizing tax loss sales. Compare Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (Mar. 1952).
54. See text accompanying notes 40-45 supra.
55. See text accompanying notes 28-50 supra.
56. An efficient portfolio is one that is fully diversified. A portfolio is fully diversified when
it is perfectly correlated with a general market index. See LORIE & HAMILTON, supra note 38,
at 71-87. For example, if the Dow Jones Industrial Index increases by 10%, a fully diversified
portfolio would increase by 10%. To obtain a fully diversified portfolio one must approximate
the market, i.e., hold broad range of securities in proportion to their relative value in the
market. Consequently, an investor who concentrates on high risk securities fails to approxi-
mate the market, and by definition holds an inefficient underdiversified portfolio. See LORm
& HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 270.
57. See Modigliani & Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return, Part II, 30 FIN. ANAL.
J. 69, 82-85 (May-June 1974).
58. The mathematical specifications are the correlation and the beta coefficients. The
prescription of a beta, measure of market sensitivity, would control the relative risks of the
portfolio and serves as a measure of the trustees' effectivenss to control risk. The prescription
of a correlation coefficient, the degree to which two variables move together, measures the
diversification of the portfolio relative to a comprehensive market index. See LORiE &
HAMILTON, supra note 38, at 265, 267, 269.
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Modern Capital Market Theory and the Margin Regulations
The current law of margin controls is incomplete and unsuited to
investor needs. The regulations ignore the relationship between risk
and return when evaluating whether an investment is speculative.
Moreover, despite the margin requirements, an investor can still
position his portfolio at a high risk level by purchasing risky securi-
ties with little or no credit, instead of less risky securities with
leverage. Similarly, the regulations may prohibit an investor from
holding a strongly levered diversified portfolio, although his invest-
ment may be less risky than an unlevered portfolio of risky securi-
ties.
The erroneous legal approach to risk and the failure of the law to
respond to recent investment developments has resulted in the mis-
application of the margin regulations. The worst effect of this ap-
proach is the narrow legislative concern with particular extension of
credit rather than with portfolio risk. This narrow focus fosters two
undesirable consequences.
First, the margin restrictions foster costly underdiversification.
An investor precluded from his desired degree of leverage 59 will con-
centrate on stocks of above average risk to achieve higher expected
returns. This produces underdiversification, which actually contrib-
utes to increased investor risk, and forces the investor to incur large
amounts of uncompensated independent risk.
Second, and perhaps most serious, the margin restrictions con-
tribute to stock market instability. The margin restrictions have
created an artificial demand for the more volatile stocks listed on
the exchanges, resulting in the bidding up of the prices of those
stocks to the point where the expected return is below that of less
volatile stocks after correction for the difference in volatility, 0
.thereby distorting the relative value of different risk classes of stock.
Furthermore, the underdiversification fostered by the restrictions
exposes risk preferring investors to unnecessary independent risk.
Consequently, their portfolios will be less stable than a well diversi-
fied leveraged portfolio. This, in turn, contributes to the overall
instability of the market.
Thus, margin regulations are worse than ineffectual. They ac-
tually contribute to stock market instability and unduly discrimi-
nate against investors seeking higher expected returns. The law
must focus on a more rational concept of investor regulation if this
problem is to be solved.
59. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
60. See Black, Jensen, & Scholes, supra note 27, at 79. See also Langbein & Posner,
Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1 (1976).
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PROPOSED REMEDIES
The ineffective and counterproductive nature of margin regula-
tion is due to the incomplete nature of the regulations. Assuming
that the decision to retain some sort of margin restriction has been
made, it is necessary to change the whole regulatory framework to
bring the regulations into conformity with investor needs. The regu-
lations must focus upon portfolios as a whole rather than particular
extensions of credit. It must consider the risk of the loan in conjunc-
tion with the other securities held by the persons regulated.
The necessary reform would have two major sections. First, risk
would be defined in terms of uncertainty, rather than simply as risk
of loss. Second, emphasis would be shifted away from the risk of
capital loss associated with a particular securities loan and toward
the risk of the entire portfolio. This would be accomplished by speci-
fying a maximum level of risk, as measured by the beta coefficient
of a fully diversified portfolio. Any portfolio involving risk above
that specified level would, by definition, be speculative.
This reform would shift the emphasis away from the risk asso-
ciated with a particular extension of a security's loan to the more
meaningful inquiry of the effect on the risk of the entire portfolio.
Consequently, diversification would be encouraged and market sta-
bility improved, thereby complying with the stated goals of margin
restrictions.
CONCLUSION
The economic impact of margin controls is significant and neces-
sitates substantial revision of the controls. Today's investor no
longer needs to be protected against himself, but rather needs pro-
tection against the undesirable consequences of the current margin
regulations. The incomplete nature of the regulations actually
promotes market instability and may prevent investors from hold-
ing well diversified portfolios.
The solution to this problem is not necessarily the abolition of the
controls but the redefinition of the regulations to conform to modern
theory. By focusing on portfolios as a whole rather than particular
extensions of credit, it would be possible to specify precise standards
of allowable risks corresponding to the basic principles of modern
capital market theory. The problem cannot be solved unless the
goals of modern capital market theory become those of the Federal
Reserve Board.
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